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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
John Alan Schulz appeals from appeals from the judgment of conviction
entered upon a jury verdict finding him guilty of felony injury to a child.

Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedings
The following factual recitation is based upon testimony presented at jury
trial:
On June 30, 2009, Coeur d'Alene pediatrician Dr. Thomas Rau examined
EMS, Schulz's fifteen year-old daughter, who had bruising described as "bright
red/purple marks on her neck" that were "symmetrically placed on both sides of
her neck and regular in pattern," which normally meant that they were
intentionally caused. (Tr., p.31, L.12 - p.33, L.22; p.35, Ls.3-16; p.64, Ls.3-4.)
EMS told Dr. Rau that the bruising on her neck "had been caused by a dog
running across her and stepping on her neck," which the doctor thought was
impossible because the bruising was symmetrical and there were no scratch
marks from claws. (Tr., p.36, Ls.20-25; p.37, Ls.8-13.) Dr. Rau testified that, in
his opinion, EMS's neck injuries were consistent with strangulation or choking.
(Tr., p.38, L.21 - p.39, L.7),
On July 2, 2009, EMS was inteNiewed by Post Falls Police Detective
Dave Beck, and she informed him she had been helping Schulz move items 'from
his ex-wife's residence, and when they were inside their garage, he "put his right
hand around her throat and began to choke her." (Tr., p.229, L.13 - p.231, L.2.)
Schulz was charged in a criminal complaint with two counts of felony injury to

1

child. 1 (Vol. I, R., pp.62-63.) During trial, the prosecution introduced portions of
EMS's testimony at two preliminary hearings as substantive evidence by having
EMS read her previous answers in response to the questions asked by the
prosecutor during those hearings.

(Vol. II, R., p.278 (Jury Instr. No. 15); see

generally Tr., p.146, L.22 - p.170, L.19.)

During the first preliminary hearing,

held August 6, 2009, 2 EMS testified that Schulz got angry with her when she was
riding in the back of a truck trying to keep his barbeque and TV from getting
damaged, and also when they were unloading the items into his house.

(Tr.,

p.146, L.25 - p.14 7, L.2; p.149, L.9 - p.150, L.9.) EMS further testified during
that hearing that when she and Schulz went into the garage, he put his right hand
on her throat, and "started applying force" for "about a minute, which impaired
her ability to breathe." (Tr., p.151, L.8 - p.152, L.20.) When asked whether she
had any marks from where Schulz touched her on June 28 th , she answered, "I
had bruises on my neck." (Tr., p.153, Ls.14-20.)
EMS testified similarly at the second preliminary hearing, held February
19, 2010, that Schulz was continually yelling at her when she was helping him
move his property items, including a TV and barbecue, to his house. (Tr., p.154,
L.25 - p.156, L.23.) When EMS was helping Schulz unload his barbecue and TV
at his house, she almost dropped each in succession, and Schulz yelled at her

1

The second count was based upon an allegation that on April 12, 2009, Schulz
beat EMS with a belt. (Vol. I, R., pp.34-35.) Although Schulz was bound over to
district court on both counts (Vol. I, R., pp.62-63), the second count was not
pursued at trial.
2

The state is unable to discern from the record why there were two preliminary
hearings.
2

each time. (Tr., p.156, L.12 - p. 157, L.10.) When asked what happened after
that, EMS testified:
We got some table chairs out of the bed of the truck. Also
put them in the garage. Then I shut the tailgate of the truck, and
we went inside to the garage. And then he yelled at me and put his
right hand on my neck and started squeezing and said that, if I told
anyone that he yelled at me or anything, that I'd be in trouble.
(Tr., p.157, Ls.15-21.) EMS repeated that Schulz used his right hand to squeeze
her neck, and did so for "[a]bout a minute and a half or two." (Tr., p.157, L.22 p.158, L.2.) EMS staid that while Schulz was squeezing her neck, it was difficult
for her to breathe, and "just felt rally constricting and kind of like when a snake like having a snake around your neck squeezing." (Tr., p.158, Ls.3-11.) While
Schulz was squeezing EMS's neck, he was saying that if she told anybody, she
would be in trouble. (Tr., p.158, Ls.12-16.) When Schulz let go of EMS's neck,
they went inside the house. (Tr., p.158, Ls.15-16.) The next day, EMS went to
the doctor because of her neck, which was bruised. (Tr., p.158, L.17 - p.159,
L.1.) EMS explained that the two photographs that were marked as Plaintiff's
Exhibit Number 1 depicted her neck injuries which she received from Schulz
during the incident in his garage. (Tr., p.159, Ls.2-14.)
During trial, EMS testified directly (i.e., not through reading her preliminary
hearing testimony) that that during Christmas break in 2010, when she was in
North Carolina with her mother, she contacted Schulz several times by both text
messaging and telephone.

(Tr., p.170, L.20 - p.171, L.24.)

During her

Christmas break contacts with Schulz, he told her he still had a car for her, and
wanted her to move in with him when she turned 18. (Tr., p.173, L.23 - p.174,
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L.24.) After her Christmas break conversations with Schulz, EMS started telling
everybody that the bruising on her neck was from "hickeys." (Tr., p.174, L.25 p.175, L.3.) During her testimony at trial, EMS admitted that she lied about the
dog causing the injuries to her neck, but continued to say that the bruising on her
neck was caused by receiving hickeys, not by Schulz choking her with his hand which she had felt pressured to say. (Tr., p.143, Ls.3-21; p.175, 21-p.178, L.9.)
Dr. Steven Malek, an emergency room physician with experience treating
strangulation victims, testified as an expert for the state based on his review of
photographs of EMS's bruised neck that (1) the bruising was consistent with a
person being strangled by one hand. (Tr., p.212, L.18 - p.213, L.11.) Dr. Malek
further testified that EMS's neck injuries were not consistent with hickeys (Tr.,
p.213, Ls.17-19), but were consistent with the kind of bruising indicative of
strangulation that could have potentially led to death (Tr., p.216, Ls.7-11).
The jury found Schulz guilty of felony injury to child. (Vol. 11, R., p.284.)
Schulz filed a Motion for Judgment of Acquittal which was denied. (Vol. II, R.,
pp.286-287, 299-300.) Schulz was given a suspended sentence of five years
with two years fixed, and was placed on probation for three years. (Vol. 11, R.,
pp.310- 321.) Schulz timely appealed. (Vol. II, R., pp.322-326.)

4

ISSUES
Schulz states the issues on appeal as:
1.

Did the district court abuse its discretion allowing Doctor
Malek's testimony over Mr. Schulz's objections because he
was not qualified as an expert for the desired testimony, and
the State failed to lay a foundation for the basis of Doctor
Malek's opinions?

2.

Did the district court err when it allowed impeachment
evidence that was based erroneously on an inconsistent
statement and, thereafter, the prosecutor committed
misconduct improperly eliciting the testimony and arguing
the substance of the erroneous answers in closing
argument?

(Appellant's Brief, p.8.)
The state rephrases the issues on appeal as:
1.
Has Schulz failed to establish the district court erred in permitting Dr.
Malek to present expert testimony about whether photographs of EMS's neck
showed bruising consistent with strangulation injuries?
2.
Has Schulz failed to establish the district court erred in ruling EMS's
testimony that she and Schulz did not discuss the subject of payment for college
was inconsistent with EMS's statement to Ms. Lotton?

5

ARGUMENT
I.

Schulz Has Failed To Establish The District Court Erred In Permitting Dr. Malek
To Present Expert Testimony About Whether Photographs Of EMS's Neck
Showed Bruising Consistent With Strangulation Injuries
A.

Introduction
During trial, the prosecution elicited expert testimony from Dr. Steven

Malek, an emergency room physician, in regard to strangulation and choking
injuries.

Based upon his review of photographs of EMS's neck, Dr. Malek

testified that the injuries he observed were consistent with injuries caused by
strangulation, and were consistent with having been inflicted with one hand. 3 On
appeal, Schulz concedes that Dr. Malek was qualified to testify as an expert
about the bruising process, the effects of strangulation, and the general
appearance of potential strangulation.

(Appellant's Brief, p.10.)

Schulz

nevertheless argues, "the State failed to establish Dr. Malek as an expert able to

3

Just before trial commenced, Schulz objected to Dr. Malek's anticipated
testimony on several grounds, including that he lacked a "factual or hands-on
basis" for his testimony, and had looked "at a page-and-a-half report, and ... at
photographs that really aren't all that good to form an expert opinion." (Tr., p.15,
L.22 - p.16, L.10.)
The district court stated it would wait and see what Dr. Malek's
"qualifications are, see what all he's reviewed to see if - see if he's done the
same thing in other cases, for example, see what kind of foundation is laid before
I can make a decision on that. So I'm going to have to deny the motion at this
point." (Tr., p.19, Ls.1-7.)
Shortly after Dr. Malek began testifying, Schulz
objected based upon relevance, and district court stated:
This is the motion we discussed earlier. I understand the
basis for it, and I've thought about it.
I've listened to the
qualifications of Dr. Malek. So the objection is overruled.
(Tr., p.203, Ls.8-11.)
6

identify the exact injury imposed, based upon reviewing a photograph, and the
mechanism causing the injury seen on the photograph."4 (Appellant's Brief, p.10
(emphasis added).)
Schulz's arguments fail. There is no requirement that an expert testifying
about a condition or injury within his or her area of expertise cannot do so based
on a review of photographs ostensibly depicting the same condition or injury.
Because Schulz has not provided any authority supporting his argument that
some specialized training is required before an expert can testify based upon a
review of photographs, that issue cannot be reviewed by this Court. Further, Dr.
Malek never testified about the "exact injury imposed" or the "mechanism causing
the injury seen on the photograph."

(See id.)

Rather, Dr. Malek testified in

general terms of whether the injuries shown in the photographs of EMS's neck
were "consistent" with strangulation injuries he has observed in his lengthy
experience as an emergency room physician.

4

Schulz reiterates he is contesting Dr. Malek's "experience or ability to identify
types of injuries from looking at a picture" (Appellant's Brief, p.12.) He argues:
The court should have prohibited the doctor from testifing [sic] that
the pictures appeared to be a bruise. There was no foundation
showing that Dr. Malek had the ability to interpret the shape and
size of a bruise from a picture. . . . There was no foundation laid
that Dr. Malek had ever been able to determine the cause of a
bruise ... from a photograph. Finally, there was no foundation laid
to demonstrate that Dr. Malek had the expertise to conclude that a
bruise on a picture appeared to be caused from a one-handed
strangulation.
(Appellant's Brief, pp.12-13.)
7

B.

Standard Of Review
The admissibility of expert testimony is discretionary and will not be

disturbed on appeal absent a showing of an abuse of discretion. State v. Crea,
119 Idaho 352, 806 P.2d 445 (1991); State v. Parkinson, 128 Idaho 29, 909 P.2d
647 (Ct. App. 1996).

C.

Schulz Has Failed To Establish Reversible Error In Relation To The
Admission Of Dr. Malek's Testimony
"To be admissible, the expert's testimony must assist the trier of fact to

understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue." State v. Joslin, 145
Idaho 75, 81, 175 P.3d 764, 770 (2007) (quotations omitted); see also I.R.E. 702.
"The function of the expert is to provide testimony on subjects that are beyond
the common sense, experience and education of the average juror." State v.
Arrasmith, 132 Idaho 33, 42, 966 P.2d 33, 42 (Ct App. 1998) {citations omitted).
Only where the normal experience of the jurors permits them to draw proper
conclusions from the facts and circumstances are expert conclusions or opinions
inadmissible.
to

testify

kl

about

Here, there is no debate over whether Dr. Malek was qualified
strangulation

injuries. 5

(See

Appellant's

Brief,

p.10

(acknowledging Dr. Malek's qualifications to testify about strangulation injuries).)
Schulz fails to cite any caselaw or statute in support of his claim that Dr.
5

Dr. Malek testified that after completing medical school, he "found a medicine
residency in Salt Lake City at the University of Utah and entered the practice of
emergency medicine after completion of that." (Tr., p.200, Ls.15-20.) He
explained that he has been in the practice of emergency room medicine since
1984, and, on average, has seen approximately two strangulation cases each
year throughout his career. 5 (Tr., p.200, L.21 - p.202, L.2.) He further
acknowledged that "what happens when a person's neck gets constricted" is "an
important part of [his] training." (Tr., p.202, Ls.3-7.)
8

Malek was not qualified to testify within his area of expertise based on reviewing
photographs of EMS's injured neck. Nor does Schulz disclose what precise type
of additional training or qualifications a conceded expert such as Dr. Malek
should be required to have before being permitted to opine within his area of
expertise based on a review of photographs. Because the issue presented by
Schulz lacks any argument, authority, or both, it should not be considered on
appeal.

In State v. Zichko, 129 Idaho 259, 923 P.2d 966 (1996), the Idaho

Supreme Court held:
When issues on appeal are not supported by propositions of law,
authority, or argument, they will not be considered.
Earlier
formulations of this rule stated that an issue was waived if it was
not supported with argument and authority. A party waives an
issue cited on appeal if either authority or argument is lacking, not
just if both are lacking. Zichko supported this assignment of error
with argument but no authority. Consequently, he waived this issue
on appeal.
Zichko, 129 Idaho at 263, 923 P.2d at 970 (citations omitted};

I.AR. 35; see

also State v. Trevino, 132 Idaho 888, 895-896, 980 P.2d 552, 559-560 (1999)
(forensic pathologist properly permitted to testify as expert by comparing injuries
that appeared in photos of defendant's hands to physical characteristics of the
murder weapon.}

Pursuant to Zichko, because Schulz has failed to present

argument, authority, or both, in support of this issue, this Court should not
consider it.
Moreover, Dr. Malek did not testify in the manner Schulz suggests. He did
not directly state that the injuries he observed in the photographs of EMS were
caused by strangulation, or that they were caused by one hand.

Instead, Dr.

Malek repeatedly answered in terms of whether the injuries viewed (or aspects of
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them) were "consistent" with injuries within his expertise - injuries caused by
strangulation.
After describing

the bruising

and

"petec~liae" commonly seen in

strangulation cases (Tr., p.207, L.16 - p.209, L.2), Dr. Malek described the
bruising he observed in the photographs of EMS's neck. (See St. Exs. 1-A, 1-B,
1-C.)

The prosecutor then asked Dr. Malek, "in your opinion, what is the

mechanism that caused those bruises?", and the physician responded (after a
relevance objection), "This is consistent with strangulation." (Tr., p.212, Ls.1823.)

Dr.

Malek explained why the photographs were consistent with

strangulation, and the prosecutor then asked whether the bruising is "consistent
with one- or two-handed manual strangulation." (Tr., p.212, L.25 - p.213, L.9.)
Dr. Malek answered, "[i]t seems to be consistent to one handed to me." (Tr.,
p.213, Ls.10-11.) Dr. Malek continued to testify about whether his observations
of the bruises on EMS's neck were consistent with various aspects of
strangulation, stating:

(a) the bruising "seems to be most consistent to one

handed" (Tr., p.213, Ls.10-11); (b) "[t]hey're not consistent with hickeys" (Tr.,
p.213, Ls.17-19); (c) they are "not consistent with self inflicted" (Tr., p.214, Ls.2425); and (d) they are "consistent" with the kind of bruising indicative of
strangulation that could have potentially led to death (Tr., p.216, Ls?-11).
Finally, Schulz asserts "the district court's error in admitting the doctor's
testimony specific to E.M.S. was not harmless."
(capitalization modified).)

(Appellant's Brief, p.15

Even assuming Dr. Malek's expert testimony was

inadmissible, "[e]rror may not be predicated upon a ruling which admits or
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excludes evidence unless a substantial right of the party is affected .... " I.RE
103(a). See also I.C.R. 52 ("Any error, defect, irregularity or variance which does
not affect substantial rights shall be disregarded.").

"The inquiry is whether,

beyond a reasonable doubt, a rational jury would have convicted [the defendant]
even without the admission of the challenged evidence." State v. Johnson, 148
Idaho 664, 669, 227 P.3d 918, 923 (2010) (citing Chapman v. California, 386
U.S. 18, 24 (1967); Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 18 (1999)). The state
has the burden of demonstrating that an objected-to, non-constitutional error is
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 222, 245
P.3d 961,974 (2010).
Schulz appears to argue that, although Dr. Rau also gave his opinion that
EMS's neck injuries were consistent with strangulation or choking (see Tr., p.38,
L.21 - p.39, L.7), it somehow made a difference that he believed the injuries
were consistent with two hands having been used to strangle EMS, in contrast to
Dr. Malek's opinion that her injuries were consistent with one hand having been
used (Appellant's Brief, pp.15-16.) Based upon the testimony presented at trial,
as set forth in the Statement Of Facts herein, any error in admitting Dr. Malek's
testimony was, beyond a reasonable doubt, harmless.

11

11.
Schulz Has Failed To Establish The District Court Erred In Ruling EMS's
Testimony That She And Schulz Did Not Discuss The Subject Of Payment For
College Was Inconsistent With EMS's Statement To Ms. Lotton

A

Introduction
Schulz argues that the district court erred by allowing Lorissa Lotton, a

Health and Welfare social worker, to testify about a prior inconsistent statement6
by EMS -- that EMS told her that, in a conversation with Schulz during Christmas
break in 2010, he said he would pay for her college.

(Appellant's Brief, p.16

("The district court erred in allowing the prosecutor to question witnesses about
consistent statements under the guise of impeachment.") Schulz also contends
that because EMS's statements about her conversation with Schulz about the
subject of college were consistent, it was improper7 for the prosecutor to infer
during closing argument that they were inconsistent and "use the inferred

6

I.R.E. 613(b) states in relevant part:
Extrinsic evidence of a prior inconsistent statement by a witness is
not admissible unless the witness is afforded an opportunity to
explain or deny the same and the opposite party is afforded an
opportunity to interrogate the witness thereon, or the interests of
justice otherwise require.

7

The heading of Schulz's appellate brief on this issue states that "the prosecutor
committed misconduct" by eliciting such testimony. (Appellant's Brief, p.16
(capitalization modified).) However, no such argument is advanced in the body
of Schulz's argument, therefore, the state will not address it further as it has been
waived. Zichko, 129 Idaho 259, 923 P.2d 966. Moreover, the prosecutor
received a ruling from the district court permitting him to elicit testimony from Ms.
Lotton about EMS's prior inconsistent statement to her. Schulz has cited no
authority for his claim that presenting evidence the court has ruled admissible
should be reviewed as prosecutorial misconduct instead of trial error.
12

inconsistency for substantive proof, not to question the credibility of the
witnesses." 8 (Id.)
Contrary to Schulz's argument, the district court correctly determined that
EMS's trial testimony was inconsistent with a statement EMS made to Ms. Lotton
in March, 2011, in which EMS reported that Schulz told her he would pay for her
college.

Additionally, because Schulz did not object to the prosecutor's

comments during closing argument he has failed to preserve that issue on
appeal.

B.

Standard Of Review
Evidentiary rulings by the trial court are reviewed for an abuse of

discretion. State v. Porter, 130 Idaho 772, 785, 948 P.2d 127, 140 (1997); State
v. Lewis, 126 Idaho 77, 82, 878 P.2d 776, 781 (1994).

"Generally Idaho's

appellate courts will not consider error not preserved for appeal through an
objection at trial." State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209,224,245 P.3d 961,976 (2010)

C.

The District Court Correctly Concluded EMS's Statement To Ms. Lotton
Was Inconsistent With Her Trial Testimony
EMS testified that during Christmas break in 2010, when she was in North

Carolina with her mother, she communicated several times with Schulz by both

8

Schulz also challenges the prosecutor's closing argument comments that
Schulz promised EMS a car and said she could move in with him after she turned
18 as referring to "substantive evidence rather than merely impeaching
evidence." (Appellant's Brief, p.21.) Because EMS testified at trial that Schulz
told her during their Christmas break contact that he still had a car for her and
wanted her to move in with him after she turned 18, there was substantive
evidence supporting the prosecutor's comments on those two matters. (Tr.,
p.170, L.20 - 172, L.19; p.173, L.17 - p.174, L.24.)
13

text messaging and telephone.

(Tr., p.170, L.20 -

p.171, L.24.)

The

communications between EMS and Schulz lasted for a few days and did not
continue after she returned to California. (Tr. p.172, Ls.2-19.) During trial, EMS
was asked by the prosecutor if, "[w]hen you had contact with your dad and were
texting him on your telephone, what did you and he talk about?" (Tr., p.173,
Ls.17-19.) After EMS explained that she and Schulz talked about how he was
doing, his work, and if he had any girlfriends or pets (Tr., p.173, Ls.20-22), the
following colloquy took place between EMS and the prosecutor:
Q.

Did the subject of a car come up?

A.

Yes. I was wondering if he still had my Forerunner [sic].

Q.

Can you tell us how that subject came up.

A.

It was just a random question.

Q.

Did your dad indicate he still had a car for you?

A.

Yes, he did.
today.

Q.

Did the subject of your dad paying for college for you come
up?

A.

No, it did not. Because I get free college because he was in
the Coast Guard, but that -- I've known that forever.

Q.

He never indicated to you that he was going to take care of
your college?

A.

No.

Q.

Did the subject of you moving in with him when you turned
18 come up?

A.

Yes, it did.

Q.

Describe that for us, please.

But that had nothing to do with my decision

14

A

He just said that he wanted me to, but I never really made a
decision.

Q.

And it was after this contact with your dad that you started
telling everybody that this was a bruising from hickeys?

A

Yes.

(Tr., p.174, L.2- p.175, L.3 (emphasis added).)
In sum, EMS testified Schulz told her during Christmas break of 2010 that
he still had a car for her and he wanted her to move in with him after she turned
18 years of age.

(Id. see n.8, supra.)

However, EMS flatly denied that the

subject of Schulz paying for her college had "come up" during her Christmas
break contacts with Schulz in 2010. (Id.)
After EMS testified, the prosecutor asked Ms. Lotton if EMS had told her
anything in March, 2011, "about whether her father had made any promises to
her," to which Ms. Lotton replied, "[y]es, she did." (Tr., p.259, L.24 - p.60, L.2.)
Schulz's attorney objected to the question based on hearsay, and after the jury
was excused, the prosecutor made an offer of proof showing that in March, 2011,
EMS told Ms. Lotton that Schulz said he was "going to pay for her college." (Tr.,
p.259, L.24 - p.261, L.18.)

The court permitted a "dry run" of Ms. Lotton's

testimony outside the jury's presence, and when asked if EMC "indicate[d] to you
in terms of a promise in regards to paying for college?", Ms. Lotton answered
affirmatively and explained that EMS had told her, "[m]y dad is going to pay for
my college." (Tr., p.262, L.12 - 263, L.1.) Upon cross-examination during the
previewed testimony, Ms. Lotton reiterated that EMS told her that during her

15

conversation with Schulz, he told her "he's going to pay for school," and that "he
would pay for school." (Tr., p.264, Ls.8-16.)
The district court ruled that EMS's testimony that she and Schulz didn't
have any discussion about "whether [he] promised her anything to be - that he
was going to pay for college" was inconsistent with her statement to Ms. Lotton,
and permitted the Ms. Lotton's anticipated testimony as a prior inconsistent
statement.

(Tr., p.264, L.21 - p.265, L.7.) After the jury was returned to the

courtroom, the prosecutor asked Ms. Lotton if in March, 2011, EMS told her
whether Schulz had made any promises to her, and specifically "anything about
college." (Tr., p.265, L.22 - p. 266, L.4.) Ms. Lotton explained that EMS said,
'"[m]y dad said he'd pay for college."' (Tr., p.266, Ls.6-7.)
The two statements by EMS about whether Schulz said he would pay for
her college could not get any more inconsistent. EMS testified at trial that the
subject of Schulz paying for her college never came up, and he never told her he
was going to take care of her college. (Tr., p.174, Ls.11-18.) However, EMS told
Ms. Lotton that Schulz told her he would pay for college. (See Appellant's Brief,
p.17 ("[EMS] testified that the subject of college did not come up during their
contact"), compare with p.18 ("the prosecutor asked the caseworker about
promises E.M.S.'s dad made and she answered that E.M.S. told her that her dad
promised to pay for college.") Schulz has failed to demonstrate any abuse of
discretion in the district court's determination that EMS's trial testimony was
inconsistent with what she told Ms. Lotton.
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Finally, Schulz argues it was improper for the prosecutor to refer in his
closing argument to testimony about three promises Schulz made to EMS (a car,
college payment, and allowing her to move in with him after she turned 18) "as
substantive evidence rather than merely impeaching evidence."

(Appellant's

Brief, p.21.) However, Schulz did not object to the prosecutor's comments during
trial (see Tr., p.59, Ls.7-25); therefore, he has failed to preserve this issue for
appeal.

State v. Perry. 150 Idaho 209, 224, 245 P.3d 961, 976 (2010)

("Generally Idaho's appellate courts will not consider error not preserved for
appeal through an objection at trial."). Where a claim is raised for the first time
on appeal, the appellate court will consider whether the error alleged qualifies as
fundamental error. 9

kL.

at 228, 245 P.3d at 980.

Because Schulz has not

presented any argument in regard to fundamental error (see Appellant's Brief,
pp.16-21 ), he has failed to meet his burden of showing fundamental error under
Perry, and his issue cannot be reviewed.

9

In order to prevail on his claim that the prosecutor's closing argument
constituted fundamental error, Schulz must satisfy the three-part test articulated
by the Idaho Supreme Court in Perry:
(1) the defendant must demonstrate that one or more of the
defendant's unwaived constitutional rights were violated, (2) the
error must be clear or obvious, without the need for any additional
information not contained in the appellate record, including
information as to whether the failure to object was a tactical
decision; and (3) the defendant must demonstrate that the error
affected the defendant's substantial rights meaning (in most
instances) that it must have affected the outcome of the trial
proceedings.
150 Idaho at 226,245 P.3d 978.
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CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm Schulz's conviction
and sentence for felony injury to a child.
DATED this 28 th day of August, 2012.
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